former Agriculture

The Forest Resources of the Former USSR
$185.00
This work conveys the timber assessment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) Forest Study for the former European USSR. Aspects of air pollution, silviculture practices, wood supply and forestry practice are covered. Begun in 1986, the Forest Study has assembled a detailed database of forest resources which have been linked to a matrix-type simulation model. The model generates projections of growing-stock and timber-harvest volumes over time by country, species group and age, making it possible to undertake a general timber-supply assessment. The forest-decline effects caused by air pollutants have been simulated in the model by taking into account depositions, critical loads for air pollutants and resulting damage cycles and growth losses.

The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 (The Industrialization of Soviet Russia) (Vol 5)
$135.00
"The Years of Hunger" by Stephen Wheatcroft and R.W. Davies, two of the top historians of the USSR, is far and away the best book on the famine of 1931-33. Simply put, no one has done the archival research these two have, no one has put the pieces in place like these two have. The book is a gripping account, almost like a narrative, of the famine and the Soviet political culture, as well as the mentality of the populace. The early chapters describe the major state programs of collectivisation, dekulakisation, and crop collection. The later chapters examine the nature of the Sovkhozy and Kolkhozy the death of livestock, as well as a concluding chapter rebutting various arguments made by political ideologues about the famine and putting it in historical perspective.

The many and varied factors causing the famine are dmonstrated to a high degree. Overall, and quite generally, the famine resulted from bad policy rushed into quickly. However, this isn't the whole story. The famine was as bad as it was because of a whole slew of phenomena that corresponded with the bad policy. Policy limiting the extent of fallow land and mandated overcultivation, for example, severely reduced flexibility of planting times which became disastrous when combined with odd weather conditions. The bungling of grain collections by the state is explored in excruciating, but gripping, detal. Wheatcroft and Davies frequently recount series of communication between officials, or proposed policy documents as they circulate through the heirarchy, describing the conditions and proposing oslutions, and the response of the higher ups. The top leadership comes off looking somewhat bad on net, altohugh there are a number of examples of people like Stalin making the right decision in the face of incompetent subordinates. The caricature of Stalin as tyrant who would allow no criticism is thoroughly demolished. From what I gathered from the book, the authoritarian nature of the political system and restrictions on/intimidation of people who would potentially speak up did not seem to be as big of a problem as it was in some other authoritarian nations with major famines.

One problem is their criticism of Mark Tauger's arguments about the role of plant disease that was spreading throughout the area (somewhat independent of state policy). Tauger (correctly) presents this as a small but significant cause, whereas Wheatcroft and Davies would have it be insignificant. However, their argument agianst Tauger is completely incoherent. This should be obvious when one reads it, but you can also find Tauger's review of this book on the Economic History website.

Although there are only a few pages dedicated to refuting alternative explanations of the famine, this book serves to utterly destroy right wing (the famine was deliberate) and left wing (it was caused by reactionary saboteurs) myths about the famine. There is no evidence of an intentional famine at all, and the book recounts the serious attempts of the state to help mitigate and eliminate the famine. The authors even quote a personal correspondence with Robert Conquest in which he concedes (contrary to what he got famous for saying for decades) that the famine wasn't intentional. While only a few Ukrainian nationalist cranks hold this view, the book clearly destroys the idea of a famine concentrated only or overwhelmingly in the Ukraine. They show that 5.5-6.5M died in the famine, rather than some higher estimates.

While they don't explicitly mention them, this book refutes the favorite claims of certain Stalinists about the famine. To give one example, Douglas Tottle has tried to show the extent of sabotage by giving a few examples of saboteurs killing livestock and attributing the entire decline to sabotage. The chapter in this book on livestock, however, shows that the livestock starved in the famine itself! They also show how the condition they were kept in in state and collective farms contributed to the deaths of livestock.